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Core Groups: The Way to Real European Defence 
Dick Zandee  
European countries continue to have 
different political views on the use of 
military force. Their armed forces also 
show a wide variety in terms of capabilities 
for operations low to high in the spectrum. 
Thus, European strategic autonomy in 
deploying armed forces for military 
operations requires a new approach. 
Rather than pursuing the impossible – 
acting at 28 – European countries should 
form core groups of partners with 
comparable intent, willingness and 
capabilities. France and the UK can 
provide the core for a European 
intervention force while Germany and 
Poland could constitute the core of a heavy 
land force formation. All core groups 
should support each other in a network, to 
be developed under the overarching 
umbrella’s of the EU and NATO. 
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synchronised manner remains a challenge, 
practice has shown that the EU is able to 
improve security and stabilise former conflict 
areas. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and the 
Horn of Africa have not reached the phase of 
self-sustainable peace and security. Yet, 
without the EU efforts they would most 
probably be worse off today. The EU’s added 
value vis-à-vis NATO or military coalitions of 
the willing is the joined-up approach of the 
coordinated use of all available means – as 
practice is proving. 
 
The same logic could be applied to hybrid 
threats. They require hybrid responses. Tanks 
and fighter aircraft are of little or no value 
when energy flows to Europe are interrupted. 
A European policy to decrease energy 
dependencies from potential adversaries 
should be the answer. Cyber threats have to be 
countered on a government-wide basis – and 
even involving the private sector – not just by 
defence forces. But make no mistake: hybrid 
responses are not just about better strategic 
communications, decreasing energy 
dependencies and cyber defence. It is also 
about military power. Europe is particularly 
weak in this area. So, the question arises: can 
the EU deliver what it is promising in the 
Global Strategy and the Implementation Plan 
for Security and Defence, including at the high 
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The European Union Global Strategy argues 
for strategic autonomy for Europe to secure 
peace and safeguard security within and 
beyond its borders. The EU has a wide range 
of instruments at its disposal, from military 
and civilian crisis management tools under the 
Common Security and Defence Policy to 
humanitarian relief, development aid and state-
building programmes. Although the joined-up 
approach of deploying these instruments in a 
 2 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
end of the spectrum? This question becomes 
all the more relevant after Donald Trump has 
entered the White House. American pressure 
on Europe to take care of its own security will 
further increase. What can be done in case the 
shots are called? 
 
DIVERSITY IN CAPABILITIES 
All European countries are strong in what 
could be called ‘soft military power’: 
capabilities required for stabilisation 
operations, working together with civilian 
actors and local authorities to restore failed 
states and help them to transition into 
functioning societies. But the higher in the 
spectrum, the bigger European shortfalls 
become. Partly, this is caused by a lack of 
enablers, such as strategic reconnaissance and 
intelligence, air-to-air refuelling and 
interoperable command and control 
capabilities. Equally, European countries have 
limited amounts of expensive precision 
munitions. There is a lack of adequate 
numbers of platforms able to deliver heavy fire 
power – in particular land-based, both for 
combat units and combat support units. 
 
For more than two decades European 
countries have reduced their heavy units and 
restructured to rapidly deployable and lightly 
armed, infantry-based forces. It was the right 
thing to do in order to be able to carry out 
crisis management operations in the Balkans 
during the 1990s and, later on, even further 
away in the Middle East and Africa. The new 
security environment asks for more mixed 
forces, still with rapidly deployable 
components in order to reinforce  NATO’s 
borders quickly or to intervene outside Europe 
when needed – but also with more stronger 
components able to deter or, when required, 
to engage with opponents equipped with 
heavier weaponry. 
 
The need to strengthen the robustness of 
armed forces is clearly stated by NATO in 
 order to reinforce deterrence and defence in 
view of Russia’s behaviour and military 
activities. The EU Global Strategy and the 
Implementation Plan for Security and Defence 
have also underlined the need for 
strengthening high-spectrum forces. So, there 
is clarity and consistency in NATO and in the 
EU.  
 
What about those who have to deliver these 
stronger forces, the member states? The 
military capability landscape in Europe 
continues to reflect history, geography and 
national interests. At the one end, France and 
the United Kingdom have interventionist 
capabilities, rapidly deployable, supported by 
their own strategic reconnaissance assets and 
capable of delivering heavy fire power. 
However, the scale is limited and sustainability 
is poor due to force reductions as a result of 
defence budget cuts and increasing 
commitments at home due to the persistent 
threat of terrorism, in particular in France. 
 
At the other extreme end countries like Austria 
and Ireland have national defence forces able 
to contribute to low-spectrum operations but 
with very limited high-end capabilities. All the 
other European countries are somewhere in 
between. Some of them invest primarily in 
modernising their land forces (the Baltic States, 
Poland) for obvious reasons while others aim 
to keep at full spectrum air, naval and land 
forces – either on their own (Germany) or 
through deepening defence cooperation with 
close neighbours (e.g. the Benelux countries).  
 
This diverse capabilities landscape is unlikely to 
change soon because member states still plan 
their future forces nationally – at best in close 
harmony with reliable cluster partners. 
European countries are certainly not doing this 
at the NATO or EU level – despite all 
declarations on long-term planning 
coordination, promises of increasing 
collaborative defence spending and what have 
you. 
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The implication of this state of affairs is that 
closing the main gaps in European capability 
shortfalls – in particular at the high-end of the 
spectrum – will rest on the shoulders of fewer 
than 28 member states collectively. These are 
the shoulders of the larger countries and of 
those smaller member states willing and able to 
join them. Thus, it would be wrong to treat the 
issue of improving European military forces 
solely in the context of the two international 
organisations concerned, the EU and NATO. 
The reasons are practical and factual – the 
different capability profiles – but there are also 
important political arguments. It is unlikely 
that 28 member states will unanimously agree 
or agree in time on high-spectrum 
intervention-type military operations. In the 
EU consensus is only possible for military 
CSDP operations in a relatively benign 
environment. The recent past is proving that 
high-spectrum operations are carried out by a 
single nation (the French interventions in Mali 
and the Central African Republic) or by a 
coalition of the willing (the anti-ISIS coalition 
under the leadership of the United States). 
 
CONSEQUENCES 
In the EU of 28 member states political 
consensus to deploy forces for high-spectrum 
interventions is out of reach, also in the 
foreseeable future. Equally, the lack of 
cohesion in military capabilities among 
European states will continue to exist. This 
leads to a different path to find the solution for 
Europe’s most serious problem in defence: the 
persistent shortfalls in military capabilities for 
acting on its own. 
 
1. CSDP.  As, politically, EU unanimity on 
launching military operations at the highest 
end of the spectrum is unlikely, there seems to 
be little room for using CSDP as the 
framework. Even if unanimity were to be 
attainable, decision-making would take too 
much time. Of course, if the willing and able 
member states would nevertheless opt for 
using the EU framework, then unused Treaty 
potential (such as enhanced cooperation or 
permanent structured cooperation) would be 
an option. But it should be noted that such 
potential has existed for some time. It seems 
that countries like France for the foreseeable 
future will prefer to operate outside the 
multilateral framework – at least at the start of 
an intervention, the ‘initial entry phase’. 
 
This sober statement on the EU context does 
not at all mean that the CSDP’s motto is 
‘business as usual’. Collective capability 
requirements have to be reviewed – based on 
the new tasks stemming from the Global 
Strategy and the Implementation Plan. As 
eloquently described in Sven Biscop’s recent 
publication, capability planning and review 
should encompass all theoretically possible 
CSDP operations, from support to border 
security and stabilisation, training and capacity-
building, and from low to high in the 
spectrum.1 This recalculation of collective 
CSDP requirements, taking into account new 
tasks, will be carried out this year in the context 
of reviewing the EU’s Capability Development 
Plan. 
 
2. High-end, smaller groups. The 
development and deployment of high-end 
spectrum capabilities outside Europe rests on 
the shoulders of a smaller group, preferably 
with the participation of the maximum amount 
of larger European countries. The need to 
involve the United Kingdom also argues for a 
format outside the EU – in addition to the 
argument that EU consensus on time-urgent, 
high-end operations is unlikely to be obtained.  
In fact, a European intervention force has 
already been created, the Franco-British 
Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), 
the main operational product of the 2010 
bilateral Lancaster House Treaty. The British 
Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) constitutes the 
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national module. Several European countries – 
the three Baltic States, Denmark, Norway and 
the Netherlands – signed a Letter of Intent in 
September 2014 to join the JEF. Clearly, these 
two multinational operational formations now 
also serve the purpose of keeping the UK 
connected to its European partners in capability 
development, including for high-end operations. 
 
3. EU & NATO. Although such European 
military intervention capabilities are developed 
outside the EU and NATO, they perfectly fit in 
the collective requirements of these two 
organisations. They should somehow be taken 
into account when assessing European efforts to 
solve the well-known shortfalls. The often heard 
argument of ‘a single set of forces’ also means 
that new formations like the CJEF and the JEF 
cannot be treated solely as serving bilateral or 
regional interests. They can fulfil European 
mission needs without necessarily operating as 
an EU or NATO force. However, nothing 
precludes them from also serving NATO, either 
for urgent deployment to reinforce the defence 
of the Alliance’s territory under Article 5 or for 
high-end non-Article 5 operations. 
 
The renaissance of NATO’s  original core task 
will have huge consequences for European 
capabilities. No matter if the United States’ 
reassurance measures remain fully in place or in 
case President Trump decides to reduce the 
enhanced American presence in Europe, the 
countries on the Eastern side of the Atlantic will 
have to deliver more capabilities. In particular, 
this applies to land forces.  
 
4. Core groups. Despite the new upward trend 
in European defence expenditure, financial 
ceilings will limit the options for strengthening 
armed forces across the board. Countries are 
already setting new priorities, mainly based on 
their own national or regional interests. The 
Baltic States have opted for spending most of 
their defence budgets on modernising land 
forces, taking into account the growing threat 
from Russia. Poland is doing the same; it is also 
investing in new helicopters and fighter aircraft. 
Germany has reactivated two tank battalions and 
is expanding its armoured vehicles fleet. On the 
other hand, the UK is further reducing its tank 
arsenal and continues to focus on quickly 
deployable, expeditionary forces. Mediterranean 
countries are paying more attention to naval 
forces, taking into account the migration 
pressure on their southern borders.  
 
So, why not incorporate these different 
capability priorities when addressing the 
question of how best to realise better European 
military capabilities? The solution to the 
problem is more likely to be found in groups of 
the willing and able rather than in the formula of 
‘all contributing to everything’. This continues to 
be a non-starter in the EU and NATO with such 
a different landscape of capability profiles and 
preferences of their member states. 
 
The answer has to be: a network of core groups, 
which are constituted on the basis of a 
comparable will to act and backed up by their 
military capabilities. A group with France and 
the UK as the core for high-intensity 
interventions outside Europe would be a logical 
formation. Other countries can hook on to, e.g., 
the British JEF or to French rapidly deployable 
capabilities. One could imagine another group 
with Germany and Poland providing the core 
for heavy land forces, needed for NATO’s 
territorial defence as a follow-on force to the 
Alliance’s rapidly deployable capabilities (the 
NATO Response Force). A third core group 
(led by Italy?) could concentrate on support to 
border security and stabilisation operations – for 
which countries not willing to engage in high-
intensity operations should make extra efforts.  
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MAINTAINING COHESION 
Such a system of core capability groups could 
result in a set of uncoordinated military 
multinational formations, splitting up Europe. 
This can be prevented by creating a network of 
core groups, which are linked to each other. The 
basic principle remains that the core capacity 
comes from the dedicated group, but countries 
participating in other core groups could still 
support other formations. For example, rapid 
intervention capabilities around a British-French 
core could be supported by enabling capabilities 
of countries not part of this core formation. 
Parts of the heavy land forces of the German-
Polish core group could be deployed as 
replacement forces for the initial entry capability. 
All member states could add capabilities to a 
border security and stabilisation operations core 
group. Certainly, interoperability and 
standardisation, in particular in areas like 
communications and command & control, are 
key for connecting member states’ armed forces 
to all core groups. 
 
The EU and NATO would have to orchestrate 
and monitor the overarching consistency of the 
network in terms of fulfilling all collective 
requirements and solving European capability 
shortfalls. Partly, the work of both organisations 
will not overlap as NATO’s Article 5 
requirements are non-existent in the EU.2 
Equally, the EU’s own needs for civil-military 
interaction have no counterpart in the Alliance. 
The harmonisation of EU and NATO activities 
in capability development should logically focus 
on the areas of overlap – the medium to high-
end spectrum capabilities.  
CONCLUSION  
It is time to stop pursuing the impossible – 
acting at 28 while interests, intent and 
capabilities are different. Enough time, energy 
and effort have been wasted. Continuing existing 
methods – also in a new jacket – will only result 
in a repetition of the past experience. Reality 
rather than theory has to be reflected in military 
capability improvement: the continuing diversity 
of defence interests and armed forces profiles 
across Europe.  
 
In order to make real progress, capability 
development should build on the strengths of 
the European countries, not on the principle of 
all EU or NATO member states moving 
forward together. The latter means that the 
current slow speed will continue to dominate as 
it reflects the lowest common denominator. The 
solution for speeding up lies in a system that 
builds on core groups of countries with 
comparable intent, willingness and capabilities. 
They should be developed under the 
overarching umbrellas – both of the EU and 
NATO – in order to ensure that all core groups 
are together in a network fulfilling all 
requirements. By providing support to each 
other the network of core groups would ensure 
European cohesion and solidarity in developing 
and deploying military capabilities. Most 
importantly, Europe can finally turn words into 
deeds with regard to taking more responsibility 
for its own security. 
 
Dick Zandee is a Senior Research Fellow at 
the Clingendael Institute in The Hague. 
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Endnotes 
1Biscop, S. (2017) Oratio pro PESCO, Egmont Paper 91.  
 
2Article 42-7 of the EU Treaty foresees mutual assistance for a member state under attack. However, in 
terms of territorial defence 22 EU countries, also members of the Alliance, rely on NATO. 
 
  
